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Background: Competition in the banking industry has been an important topic in the 
scientific literature as researchers tried to assess the level of competition in the 
banking sector. Objectives: This paper has an aim to investigate the market structure 
and a long term equilibrium of the banking market in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
nationwide as well as on its constitutional entities as well as to evaluate the 
monopoly power of banks during the years 2008-2012. Methods/Approach: The 
paper is examining the market structure using the most frequently applied measures 
of concentration k-bank concentration ratio (CRk) and Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
(HHI) as well as evaluating the monopoly power of banks by employing Panzar-Rosse 
“H-statistic”.  Results: The empirical results using CRk and HHI show that Bosnia and 
Herzegovina banking market has a moderately concentrated market with a 
concentration decreasing trend. The Panzar-Rosse “H-statistic” suggests that banks in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina operate under monopoly or monopolistic competition 
depending on the market segment. Conclusions: Banks operating on the banking 
market in Bosnia and Herzegovina seem to be earning their total and interest 
revenues under monopoly or perfectly collusive oligopoly. 
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Banks have an ultimate goal to create loans enhancing the financial flows in the 
economy generated from the collected deposit base. Having the role of the 
financial intermediation the financial system should by definition enhance efficiency 
and competitiveness on the financial market. 
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 The wealth and the profitability of banks’ customers is highly affected by the 
competition on the banking sector through the tendency of lowering the products 
and service costs (Ritter, Silber, Udell, 2014).  
 Competition has been in the scientific and practical focus in the past decades, 
not only in the banking but also in other business industries around the world. Most of 
the previous research focuses on the competitive behaviour in one or several 
countries, using the respective baking industry data sets (Abdul Majid & Sufian, 2007, 
Al-Muharrami, 2009a, Al-Muharrami 2009b, Anzoategui, Martinez, & Rocha, 2012, 
Bikker & Groeneveld, 1998, Coccorese, 2013, Hondroyiannis & Papapetrou, 1999). 
Even though the existing literature does not unfold a unique approach towards the 
problem of competition on different banking markets, several approaches are 
common to most of the research. Bikker and Haaf (2002) note that the existing 
literature on measurement of competition can be divided into two major groups (a) 
Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP) paradigm and the efficiency hypothesis (EH) 
paradigm on one side and (b) a number of formal approaches with roots in Industrial 
Organization theory.  
 The SCP methodology analyses if a highly concentrated market leads to collusive 
behaviour with larger banks which leads to their superior market performance. The 
efficiency hypothesis here tests whether it is the efficiency of larger banks that 
enables their superior market performance. The SCP paradigm relates the 
profitability to the market structure, using the number of banks/companies as 
exogenous variables in regressions of industrial profitability. The paradigm was 
criticized due to the theoretical possibility in which an industry has no entry and exit 
barriers which enables high level of competition in a highly concentrated market 
(Arrawatia & Misra, 2012). One of the most commonly used measures for 
competition based on the structural approach is the Herfindahl-Hirschman index 
(Rhodes, 1993).  
 On the other side the non-structural models of competitive behavior have 
emerged such as Iwata model, the Bresnahan model, and the Panzar-Rosse (P-R) 
model (Panzar & Rosse, 1982, 1987). 
 In recent years, significant number of research was focused on competition in the 
banking industry due to the fact that tendencies for liberalization, innovations and 
merger and consolidation of financial services sector have called for assessing the 
level of competition in the banking sector (Arrawatia & Misra, 2012). Higher level of 
bank competition is expected to have a decreasing effect of bank product and 
service prices, which by theory lead to accelerated investments and economy 
growth. There are also potential negative effects of the increasing banking 
competition in the form of the increased risk appetite which may lead to decreasing 
profitability and efficiency (Mishkin, 2013). 
 The main purpose of this paper is to investigate the market structure of banking 
market in Bosnia and Herzegovina and to evaluate the monopoly power of banks 
operating in the Bosnian market during the period 2008-2012. Ever since the recent 
war, Bosnian banking market has undergone structural reforms which include 
privatization, modernization, financial integration, foreign capital inflow and the 
challenging effects of the global financial crisis.  
 This paper has a primary goal to measure the degree of competition in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina banking market as well as to investigate the possible impact of the 
market concentration on competition. The paper also focuses on the comparison of 
the Bosnian banking market with other banking markets, with regards to the levels of 
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 Unlike in the European Union where the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) has 
generally influenced a significant change of the financial framework, the Bosnian 
banking market is still to be considered as highly underdeveloped, despite of the 
fact that majority of the market share is held by the banks in the foreign (mainly EU 
banks) ownership.  
 Most of the reviewed literature focuses on the concentration and competition 
measurement using the Panzar-Rosse model (Panzar & Rosse, 1982, 1987). This paper 
fills the gap in the literature by extending the geographical boundaries of the 
structural approach and Panzar-Rosse model application on assessing the 
competition and efficiency on the banking market in Bosnia and Herzegovina, since 
to our knowledge no similar research using data from Bosnia and Herzegovina has 
been conducted, with an exception to the study of performance analysis and 
benchmarking of commercial Banks from Bosnia and Herzegovina (Memić & Škaljić-
Memić, 2013).  
 The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the reviewed 
literature on the banking competition and efficiency. Section 3 presents the used 
methodology and data while Section 4 shows the results. Section 5 summarizes the 
paper with the concluding remark. 
 
Literature review 
The first use of the Panzar-Rosse H-statistic was conducted on the newspaper 
industry.  
 Several studies have measured the degree of competition and tested the market 
for equilibrium using structural and non-structural methods. One study used a panel 
data set covering the period from 1986 – 2004 using data from 67 different countries 
(Bikker, Shaffer, & Spierdijk, 2009). The study has shown that Panzar-Rose price or 
revenue functions cannot be used to measure the degree of banking competition, 
as the authors concluded that the Panzar-Rosse H-statistic needs requires more 
information costs, market equilibrium and market demand elasticity. 
 De Rozas (2007) used data reported by Spanish depositary institutions covering 
the period from 1986 – 2005. The study uses 92% of aggregate assets of credit 
institutions sector, which is fairly representative and comprehensive. Author used the 
Panzar-Rosse methodology and has shown that the level of competition is higher 
than reported in the previous literature. Author has also reported that on the Spanish 
sample in case of large banks the market gets close to perfect competition, and no 
apparent relationship between competition and market is found. 
 Italian banking system has also been analysed using data from the period 1988-
2000 with the final data set including 104 observations (Coccorese, 2002). The study 
uses non-linear simultaneous-equation model with an ultimate goal to identify the 
degree of competitiveness characterizing eight Italian largest banks. The study shows 
that the degree of competition on the Italian market is considerable and that there 
is no conflict between competition and concentration. 
 One paper evaluated the degree of competition among Italian banks between 
the period 1986-1996, also employing the Panzar-Rosse H-statistic (Coccorese, 2013). 
All of the used banks were classified into of the three groups on the basis of their 
respective size. The study uses total revenues as the dependent variable, as the 
models were created for each of the observed years. The results have shown that 
the model coefficients for the factor prices always positive and statistically 
significant. The main conclusion of the study is that the Italian banks have operated 
under the monopolistic competition in the period 1988-1996, and that the banks 
have been in the long-run equilibrium in only four of the observed years. 
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 Carbó, Humphrey, Maudos, & Molyneux (2009) used banking market data from 14 
European countries over the period 1995-2001, to assess the competition and pricing 
power in European banking. Among other indicators four indicators they used net 
interest margin, Lerner index, returns on assets, Panzar-Rosse H-statistic, and HHI 
market concentration, and have shown that competition often gives conflicting 
predictions of competitive behavior across and within countries. 
 Another study assessed the degree of competitiveness in the banking industry of 
the EU in total as well as the degree of competitiveness in individual countries (Bikker 
& Groeneveld, 1998). The data panel used in this study covers the period 1989- 1996 
and have shown that mainly large banks play a greater role in the financial 
intermediation process. Their results suggest that national banking sectors in the EU 
are not identical. 
 Bikker & Haaf (2000) applied the Panzar-Rosse model to banks from 23 European 
and non-European countries for the years 1988-1998. They have reported that 
banking markets in the industrial world are mainly operating under monopolistic 
competition. They also find that competition and bank size are proportional and that 
in some countries the competition has increased significantly over time. 
 Maudos & Solís, (2009) have analysed the 43 commercial banks operating in 
Mexico over the period 1993-2005. The study uses net interest margin as the 
dependent variable and shows that it can be explained by average operating costs 
and by market power. The results show that net interest margin is mainly determined 
by average operating costs and the Lerner index (Maudos & Solís, 2009). 
 Al-Muharrami (2009) analysed the market structure of the banking market of Saudi 
Arabia using data during the period 1993-2006. The Panzar-Rosse methodology 
results show that Saudi Arabia banking industry has a status of a monopolistic 
competition, and that the market is not highly concentrated as well as that it shows 
signs of concentration decline. 
 Greece banking market competition and concentration has also been assessed is 
several studies.  Delis, Staikouras, & Varlagas (2008) analyzed panel data of Greek 
banks over the period 1993-2004 and found that the static models used tend to 
underestimate the level of market power. 
 Number of other studies has used the Panzar-Rosse method to measure the 
degree of competition in the banking sector. Pruteanu-Podpiera, Weill, & Schobert 
(2008) analyzed the Czech Banking Industry, Nathan & Neave (1989) banks in 
Canada, Anzoategui, Martinez, & Rocha (2010) applied similar methodology to the 
Middle East and Northern Africa Region, Mamatzakis, Staikouras, & Koutsomanoli-
Fillipaki (2005) analysed the degree of concentration and competition in the 
enlarged European Union banking environment over the period 1998–2002, Liu, 
Molyneux, & Wilson (2013) measured competition and stability in 11 European 
countries over the period 2000-2008, Matthews, Murinde, & Zhao (2007) reported an 
empirical assessment of competitive conditions among the major British banks, 
during a period of major structural change and found a monopolistic competition, 
Yildirim & Philippatos (2007) used the data from eleven Latin American countries for 
the period 1993 to 2000 to find that banks appear to be earning their revenues under 
monopolistic competition, which was proven in many other developed and 
emerging financial systems. 
To our knowledge, this is the first research conducted with the aim of measuring 
competition and efficiency of banks in Bosnia and Herzegovina using the Panzar-
Rosse and HHI methodology. The significance of the research is that it offers an 
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perspective, which can be usefully in the desired country’s economic integration 
into the European Union and its developed financial markets. 
 
Methodology 
Structural approach: CRk and HHI indexes 
The structural approach to the measurement of competition from the SCP 
methodology has the goal to investigate whether a highly concentrated banking 
market can create an environment in which larger banks behave in a monopolistic 
direction. Such a behaviour usually causes collusive behaviour among banks which 
leads to an incensement of their profits. The SCP paradigm assumes that a higher 
bank concentration allows a higher degree of cooperation between them such that 
the banks might set higher prices and consequently gain substantial profits (Bain, 
1956). 
 The EH paradigm suggests that market structure is determined by the efficiency 
whereas profits are generated by large firms since the concentration is highly 
dependent on efficiency. Both the SCP and EH approaches use the same measures 
of concentrations. These measures of concentrations are k-bank concentration ratio 
(CRk) and Herfindahl- Herschman Index (HHI). 
 The Concentration ratio (CRk) shows the level of concentration within an observed 
industry, measured by the market share held by the substantially small number of 
firms (banks). CR takes the following form: 
 










 Whereas  𝑀𝑆𝑖 represents the individual market shares of banks on the market. The 
market shares are usually calculated as the ratio of individual bank's assets to total 
industry assets. As there are no preset rules for an appropriate value of k, the total 
number of banks included in the analysis is usually an arbitrary decision (Tushaj , 
2010), depending from the goal of the research and the size of the analyzed market. 
In the existing literature the value of k is most commonly a combination of numbers 3, 
5, 8, 10. The CR index may be considered as the concentration curve which ranges 
from zero to one, whereas the value of zero represents an infinite number of equally 
sized banks, while the value of one represents the situation in which the k banks 
create the total industry. 
 The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) is a statistical measure of a market 
concentration developed by the economists A.O. Hirschman and O.C. Herfindahl. 
HHI measure has reached a significant level of use ever since it was adopted by the 
Department of Justice of the Federal Reserve where it was used to measure the 
effects of mergers on competitiveness. This measure takes into consideration the 
number of firms (banks) by calculating their respective relative market shares 
(Rhoades, 1993). HHI is calculated as the sum of squares of market shares (𝑀𝑆𝑖)of all 
individual banks (i=1,…n) taking participation on the analyzed market. This measure 
does not however take into consideration the geographic dimension of the bank 
concentration on one market and has been detected as relatively poor and 
unreliable measure of competition (Bikker et al., 2009; Shaffer, 1993; Shaffer and 
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 The HHI index ranges between 1 𝑛⁄  and 1 and it can take the value of 
1
𝑛⁄  when all 
banks in a market have an equal size. The other extreme value of 1 HHI index 
reaches in the case of monopoly.  
 
Nonstrucutural approach: Panzar-Rosse model 
The weaknesses expressed by the structural or SCP and EH approaches are overrun 
by the new empirical industrial organization (NEIO). NEIO analyses the deviations 
between observed and marginal cost pricing, without using market structure 
indictors in order to assess the market concentration and competition (Al-Muharrami 
et al, 2006). These methods create models of industry equilibrium with the final 
outcome such that indicates the type of competitive conduct and estimates the 
reduced form revenue equations of the market participants. Such model is 
suggested by Panzar-Rosse (1987). John C. Panzar and James N. Rosse developed 
an empirical test which discriminates between different competitiveness market 
structures such as oligopoly, monopolistically competitive and perfectly competitive 
markets. Panzar-Rosse model (P-R model) creates a reduced-form equation (R^*) 
that relates specific indicators of bank revenues to a set to vector of input prices as 
well as other variables. The model produces an indicator of competition called H-
statistic, which is calculated as the sum of elasticises of gross revenue with respect to 
given input process (Bikker et al., 2009). 
 The P-R model is based on the general equilibrium market model and assumes 
that banks will use different pricing strategies as a response to changes to their input 
prices, heavily depending on the competitive environment of the market (Rozas & 
Luis, 2007).  
 The reduced form revenue equations (R*) of the market participants are derived 
from marginal revenue and cost functions and an equilibrium position which 





∗, 𝑊𝑖 , 𝑍𝑖
𝐶) (3) 
 
 where 𝑅𝑖(−) and 𝐶𝑖(−) represent the revenue and cost functions for bank 𝑖, 𝑦𝑖 
represents the output of the bank, 𝑊𝑖 represents the K-dimensional vector of factor 
input prices bank 𝑖, 𝑊𝑖 = (𝑤1𝑖, … , 𝑤𝐾𝑖), 𝑍𝑖
𝑅 represents the vector of J exogenous 
variables affecting the revenue function 𝑍𝑖
𝑅 = (𝑍1𝑖
𝑅 , … , 𝑍𝐽𝑖
𝑅) and 𝑍𝑖
𝐶 represents the 
vector of L exogenous variables affecting the cost function 𝑍𝑖
𝑅 = (𝑍1𝑖
𝐶 , … , 𝑍𝐽𝑖
𝐶 ). 
 Observing at individual bank level marginal revenues must be equal to marginal 






∗, 𝑊𝑖 , 𝑍𝑖
𝐶) (4) 
 
Therefore the indicator given by the P-R model as elasticities of total revenues of 
an individual bank are calculated by the bank’s input prices (). The sum of such 
elasticities is called H-statistic, which gives information about the competitive 
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The interpretation of the P-R H-statistic depends on its value. Depending on the 
model, the H-statistic is used to measure (a) competitive environment and (b) market 
equilibrium.  
H-statistic with negative values indicates at monopoly or perfectly collusive 
oligopoly.  Monopoly or perfectly collusive oligopoly assumes that a rise in input 
prices increases marginal costs and, by setting them equal to marginal revenues, 
reduces equilibrium output and the bank’s revenues. Negative values of H-statistic 
can also be a product of the so-called operating in isolation whereas only weak 
substitutes to the product of the analyzed firm exist.  
H-statistic with values between 0 and 1 indicates monopolistic competition. In 
monopolistic competition there is product differentiation between the outputs of the 
different banks, the profit maximizing banks are confronted with a falling aggregate 
demand curve and behave like monopolists, which results in equalizing marginal 
costs and marginal revenues in the equilibrium state. By market exit and entry of 
imperfect substitutes, the demand curve always shifts in a way that the monopolist 
earns zero profits. 
H-statistic equal to 1 indicates perfect competition in market equilibrium, assuming 
that the banks’ cost functions are linearly homogeneous to the factor prices, the 
production functions are homothetic, factor prices are exogenous to the individual 
bank, and the elasticity of the perceived demand of the individual firm is 
nondecreasing in the number of (symmetric) rivals as well as free market entry and 
exit (Panzar & Rosse, 1987). 
Panzar-Rosse H-statistic can be used for a long-run equilibrium test with return on 
assets (ROA) as the dependent variable instead of the revenue or the price 
regression equation. If the value of H-statistic is lower than 0 it indicates non-
equilibrium, whereas H-statistic equal to 1 indicates equilibrium. 
 
Table 1 
Competitive environment and equilibrium test 
Scenario Value Description 
Competitive environment 
a H ≤ 0 Monopoly or perfectly collusive oligopoly 
b 0 < H < 1 Monopolistic competition 
c H = 1 Perfect competition, natural monopoly in a perfectly contestable 
market, or sales maximizing firm subject to a break-even 
constraint 
Equilibrium test 
a H < 0 Disequilibrium 
b H=1 Equilibrium 
Source: Panzar & Rosse (1982, 1987), Molyneux et al. (1994). 
 
In order to assess the H-statistic values this paper uses two revenue and one price 
equations, as well as a model with ROA as dependent variable for conducting the 
long-run equilibrium test.   
The first revenue equation uses interest revenues as a dependent variable, and is 
given as follows: 
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𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐼𝑅 = 𝛼 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝑙𝑜𝑔𝜔𝑖 +
𝑛
𝑖=1




 where,  
𝐿𝑛 - natural logarithm 
𝐼𝑅 - Interest revenue 
𝜔𝑖 - factor prices 
𝐶𝐹𝑗 - other bank specific variables 
𝑇𝐴 - bank total assets 
𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟 - total model error 
 
 
The second revenue equation uses interest revenues as a dependent variable, 
and is given as follows: 
 
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑇𝑅 = 𝛼 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝑙𝑜𝑔𝜔𝑖 +
𝑛
𝑖=1





𝑇𝑟 - total revenues 
 
The H-statistic for the two revenue equations will be the sum of the input price 
elasticities of total revenues or  𝐻𝑠
𝑟 = ∑ 𝛽𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1  (where 𝑟 stands for revenue and 𝑠 stands 
for scaled). These revenue models have been used in existing literature to assess the 
market structure and the level of (Philip Molyneux, Thornton, & Michael Llyod-
Williams, 1996; Nathan & Neave, 1989; Shaffer, 2004). 
The price equation uses total revenues divided by total assets (𝑇𝑅/𝑇𝐴) as a 






) = 𝛼 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝑙𝑜𝑔𝜔𝑖 +
𝑛
𝑖=1







- total revenues divided by total assets 
 
The H-statistic for the price equation will be 𝐻𝑠
𝑝 = ∑ 𝛽𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1  (where 𝑝 stands for price 
and 𝑠 stands for scaled). The price model with total revenues divided by total assets 
has often been used in existing literature (Bikker et al., 2009; Phil Molyneux, Lloyd-
Williams, & Thornton, 1994; Schaeck, 2009; Yildirim & Philippatos, 2007). 
 
Equilibrium test 
In order to test the long-run equilibrium Panzar-Rosse’s H-statistic is used with a natural 
log of ROA as dependent variable (Molyneux et al., 1994; Majid & Sufijan, 2006). As 
natural log cannot take negative values, and some of the observations from the 
Bosnian banking market recorded negative values of return on assets, a variable 
transformation in the form of log (1 + 𝑅𝑂𝐴) was used. The long-run equilibtium test 
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log (1 + 𝑅𝑂𝐴) = 𝛼 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝑙𝑜𝑔𝜔𝑖 +
𝑛
𝑖=1






𝑅𝑂𝐴 - return on assets, measured as net result before tax divided by total assets 
 
The long-run equilibrium test measures the sum of the elasticity of return on assets 
with respect to input prices. In the scenario of the H-statistic (in some literature 
referred as E-statistic) taking the value of 0 or 𝐻 = ∑ 𝛽𝑖 = 0
𝑛
𝑖=1 , the banking market is in 
long-run equilibrium. If the H-statistic is not equal to 0 than the market is considered 
not to be in equilibrium (tested using F-test) as proposed in previous research (Al-
Muharrami, 2009a; Coccorese, 2013). 
 
Data and results 
Assessing the competition on the banking market in Bosnia and Herzegovina carries 
several problems. Due to the low level of awareness and resources, no research has 
been conducted on this topic using the data from the Bosnian banking market. 
Bosnian banking market is highly decentralized due to the constitutional provisions 
and consists of two separate banking markets / entities, each having their own 
regulations, regulatory authorities and none of them being the Central Bank. Lack of 
a centralized research database consisting of necessary financial data from the 
banking market is one of the main issues in conducting such a research.  
 All publicly available financial statements of banks operating in both entities in the 
panel period 2008-2012 are used in the empirical part of this research. As some of 
the banks’ financial statements were not publicly available, they are not included in 
the sample. The data for 2007 are not included due to a relatively high share of 
missing financial statements. Table 2 gives an overview of the number of 
observations in the observed period. 
 
Table 2 
Number of observations in the observed period 
Year 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Total 
Included # of banks 20 23 23 24 24 130 
Total # of banks 30 30 29 29 28 178 
% included 69,0% 79,3% 79,3% 82,8% 82,8% 73,0% 
Source: Author’s calculations 
 
The bank-years not included in the analysis are small banks, banks which faced 
bankruptcy procedures in the observed periods and one banks operating under 
principles of Islamic banking. The study also excludes development banks due to 
their different technology, structure and goal to the commercial banks (Al-
Muharrami, 2008). The included data relevance is insured as in all observed years the 
included share of total assets does not drop below 85% of total bank industry assets. 
The final dataset includes 140 observations. The data is obtained from both 
constitutional entities Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republika Srpska.  
The Table 3 gives an overview of the calculated𝐶𝑅3, 𝐶𝑅5, 𝐶𝑅8 and HHI indexes for 
loans, deposits and assets.  
The 𝐶𝑅𝑘 indicators calculated for loans, deposits and total assets show a 
decreasing concentration trend between 2008 and 2012. The concentration of loans 
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for top three banks has decreased from 47,3% in 2008 to 34,4% in 2012. The similar 
trend was detected for top 5 and top 8 banks. The HHI index for loans ranged from 
0,095 in 2008 and was decreased to 0,059 in 2012. The concentration indicators for 
deposits show a slight increase in all 𝐶𝑅3, 𝐶𝑅5, 𝐶𝑅8 groups in 2009 compared to 2008 
indicating an increasing customer confidence in largest banks. The indicators were 
relatively unchanged in 2010, but were decreasing ever since. The HHI index for 
deposits has also increased from 0,101 in 2008 to 0,109 and 0,110 in 2009 and 2010 
respectively. Following the 𝐶𝑅𝑘 trends it has decreased in 2011 and 2012, indicating a 
decreasing concentration of deposits among large banks. As assets are mainly 
consisted of loans on the banking market in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 𝐶𝑅𝑘 and HHI 
indicators for total assets are following the indexes for loans in the observed period. 
The asset concentration for the largest 3 banks has decreased from 47,5% in 2008 to 
39,6% in 2012, for largest 5 banks from 62,6% to 51,8% and from 75,3% to 64,8% for 
largest 8 banks. The HHI indicator for assets has ranged from 0,099 in 2008 to 0,076 in 
2012 and indicated a very low concentration. Generally the Bosnian market can be 
considered as one with very low concentration measured by Herfindahl-Hirschman 
Index applied to loans, deposits and total assets. 
 
Table 3 
Results of concentration ratios and Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
Year 
 
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Loans 
𝐂𝐑𝟑 47,3% 42,9% 39,5% 36,8% 34,4% 
𝐂𝐑𝟓 61,8% 58,3% 54,2% 50,1% 46,3% 
𝐂𝐑𝟖 73,6% 70,4% 65,6% 61,3% 58,1% 
𝐇𝐇𝐈 0,095 0,083 0,073 0,066 0,059 
Deposits 
𝐂𝐑𝟑 47,0% 49,2% 49,4% 47,9% 46,6% 
𝐂𝐑𝟓 61,7% 62,3% 61,5% 60,3% 58,3% 
𝐂𝐑𝟖 73,5% 73,8% 73,8% 72,5% 70,4% 
𝐇𝐇𝐈 0,101 0,109 0,110 0,107 0,102 
Assets 
𝐂𝐑𝟑 47,5% 47,0% 43,3% 41,1% 39,6% 
𝐂𝐑𝟓 62,6% 60,7% 56,5% 54,3% 51,8% 
𝐂𝐑𝟖 75,3% 74,0% 69,7% 65,3% 64,8% 
𝐇𝐇𝐈 0,099 0,097 0,086 0,083 0,076 
Source: Author’s calculations 
 
The paper includes two revenue and one price equations, as well as a model with 
ROA as dependent variable for conducting the long-run equilibrium test. The first log-
log revenue equation, with interest revenue as the dependent variable: 
 
 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐼𝑅 = 𝐶 + 𝛽1𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑃𝐹𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑃𝐿𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑃𝐾𝑖 + 𝛿𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑇𝐴 + 𝛾1𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑖
+ 𝛾2𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑖 + 𝛾3𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐵𝑅𝑖 + 𝛾4𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐿𝑇𝐷𝑖+𝛾5𝐷5𝑖
+ 𝛾6𝐷𝐸𝑖 + 𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟 
(10) 
 where 
𝐿𝑛 - natural logarithm 
𝐼𝑅 - interest revenue 
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𝑃𝐿𝑖 - ratio of personnel expenses and number of employees 
𝑃𝐾𝑖 - ratio of  other operating costs and fixed assets 
𝑇𝐴 - bank total assets 
𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑖 - ratio of risk capital and total assets 
𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑖 - ratio of loans and total assets 
𝐵𝑅𝑖 - ratio of  number of branches and total number of branches 
𝐿𝑇𝐷𝑖 - ratio of  loans and deposits 
𝐷5𝑖 - dummy variable for the largest 5 banks 
𝐷𝐸𝑖 - dummy variable for constitutional entitiy 
𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟 - total model error 
 
 The second log-log revenue equation, uses total revenue as the dependent 
variable and is given as follows: 
 
 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑇𝑅 = 𝐶 + 𝛽1𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑃𝐹𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑃𝐿𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑃𝐾𝑖 + 𝛿𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑇𝐴 + 𝛾1𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑖
+ 𝛾2𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑖 + 𝛾3𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐵𝑅𝑖 + 𝛾4𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐿𝑇𝐷𝑖+𝛾5𝐷5𝑖
+ 𝛾6𝐷𝐸𝑖 + 𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟 
(11) 
 
 The log-log price equation uses ratio of total revenues to total assets as the 






) = 𝐶 + 𝛽1𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑃𝐹𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑃𝐿𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑃𝐾𝑖 + 𝛿𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑇𝐴
+ 𝛾1𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑖 + 𝛾2𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑖 + 𝛾3𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐵𝑅𝑖
+ 𝛾4𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐿𝑇𝐷𝑖+𝛾5𝐷5𝑖 + 𝛾6𝐷𝐸𝑖 + 𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟 
(12) 
 
 For the revenue and price equations 𝐻 − 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐 = 𝛽1 + 𝛽2 + 𝛽3.  
 
 In order to assess the long-run equilibrium Panzar-Rosse’s H-statistic the following 
equation is used: 
 
 log (1 + 𝑅𝑂𝐴) = 𝐶 + 𝛽1𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑃𝐹𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑃𝐿𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑃𝐾𝑖 + 𝛿𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑇𝐴
+ 𝛾1𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑖 + 𝛾2𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑖 + 𝛾3𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐵𝑅𝑖
+ 𝛾4𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐿𝑇𝐷𝑖+𝛾5𝐷5𝑖 + 𝛾6𝐷𝐸𝑖 + 𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟 
(13) 
 
 where the H-statistic is tested for equilibrium as 𝐻 − 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐 = 𝛽1 + 𝛽2 + 𝛽3 = 0.  
All of the models are created for the whole country, as well as for each of the 
Bosnian entities. For the whole country P-R model with natural logarithm of interest 
revenue (IR) used as dependent variable, cost of funds (𝑃𝐹) and cost of labor (𝑃𝐿) 
have a statically significant effect on the interest income, with relatively high 
coefficients. Cost of funds (𝑃𝐹) variable is positively related to interest income which 
can be justified by the fact that more deposit funds collected by the bank by theory 
leads to more loans and consecutively more interest income, ceteris paribus 
(significant at 1%). Cost of labor (𝑃𝐿) variable is negatively related to interest income 
(significant at 5%). The size of bank’s assets (𝐴𝑆𝑆) as well as share of loans in total 
assets (𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁𝐴𝑆𝑆) is expectedly positively related to interest income and is significant 
at 1%. Ratio of number of branches to total number of branches also exhibits 
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expectedly a positive relationship to interest income, as bank has more branches, it 
should have more loan exposed customers (significant at 10%). Loan to deposit ratio 
(𝐿𝑇𝐷) seems to have a negative relationship with interest income. Indicator of largest 
five banks in Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as entity in which banks operate, does 
not seem to have statistically significant effect on the level of interest income. The 
Wald test does not reject the hypothesis of monopolistic market structure where H-
statistic=0 at the 5% significance level. It however rejects the hypothesis of perfectly 
competitive market structure where H-statistic=1 at the 5% significance level. The 
estimation of H=0,084 suggests that bank interest revenues in the sample period 
appear to be earned in conditions of monopolistic market structure on the banking 
market in Bosnia and Herzegovina.  
P-R model created for Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina with natural 
logarithm of interest revenue used as dependent variable, cost of funds (𝑃𝐹) and 
cost of capital o (𝑃𝐾) have a statically significant effect on the interest income. Both 
variables (𝑃𝐹 and 𝑃𝐾) variables are positively related to interest income. Cost of 
funds is significant at 1%, while cost of capital is significant at 5%. Cost of funds has 
significantly higher effect on the interest income than cost of capital. Unlike for the 
model created for on the whole country level, cost of labor has an insignificant 
effect on interest income. The size of bank’s assets (𝐴𝑆𝑆) as well as share of loans in 
total assets (𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁𝐴𝑆𝑆) is expectedly positively related to interest income and is 
significant at 1%. Ratio of number of branches to total number of branches also 
exhibits expectedly a positive relationship to interest income, similar to the one 
detected on the country level. The Wald test does not reject the hypothesis of 
monopolistic market structure in Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina where H-
statistic=0 at the 5% significance level. It however rejects the hypothesis of perfectly 
competitive market structure where H-statistic=1 at the 5% significance level. The 
estimation of H=0,105 suggests that bank interest revenues in the sample period 
appear to be earned in conditions of monopolistic market structure on the banking 
market in Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.  
P-R model created for Republika Srpska with natural logarithm of interest revenue 
used as dependent variable, out of the three used factor prices, only cost of funds 
(𝑃𝐹) have a statically significant effect on the interest income (significant at 1%), with 
very high regression coefficient. The size of bank’s assets (𝐴𝑆𝑆) as well as share of 
loans in total assets (𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁𝐴𝑆𝑆) is expectedly positively related to interest income and 
is significant at 1%. These rations are exhibiting similar effects on the dependent 
variable in all three models. Loan to deposit ratio (𝐿𝑇𝐷) seems to have a negative 
relationship with interest income in Republika Srpska, similar to the country-level 
model. The Wald test rejects the hypothesis of monopolistic market structure in 
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina where H-statistic=0 at, as well as hypothesis of 
perfectly competitive market structure where H-statistic=1 at the 5% significance 
level. The estimation of H=0,783 indicates the conclusion that bank interest revenues 
in the sample period in Republika Srpska appear to be earned in conditions of 
monopolistic competition market structure.  
The second revenue model is created on the basis of total revenues (𝑇𝑅) as 
dependent variable. On the whole country level the following variables are 
statistically significant: 𝑃𝐹, 𝑃𝐿, 𝐴𝑆𝑆, 𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁𝐴𝑆𝑆, 𝐵𝑅, 𝐿𝑇𝐷, and 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝐸. We remark that 
𝑃𝐹,  𝐴𝑆𝑆, 𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁𝐴𝑆𝑆, 𝐵𝑅 are in positive, while  𝑃𝐿, 𝐿𝑇𝐷 and 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝐸 are in negative 
relation to total revenues. The cost of funds with a positive coefficient shows that the 
increased costs of funds leading to the higher revenue, while cost of labour with a 
negative sign implicates that the increased cost of labour leading to the lower total 
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Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina where H-statistic=0 at 5% significance level, as 
well as hypothesis of perfectly competitive market structure where H-statistic=1 at the 
5% significance level. The estimation of H= -0,268 indicates the conclusion that bank 
total revenues in the sample period in Bosnia and Herzegovina appear to be earned 
in conditions of monopoly or perfectly collusive oligopoly market structure.  
For the model using total revenues as dependent variable using data from 
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the following variables are statistically 
significant: 𝑃𝐹, 𝑃𝐿, 𝐴𝑆𝑆, 𝐵𝑅 and 𝐿𝑇𝐷. We remark that 𝑃𝐹,  𝐴𝑆𝑆, 𝐵𝑅 are in positive, while  
𝑃𝐿, 𝐿𝑇𝐷 are in negative relation to total revenues. The cost of funds with a positive 
coefficient shows that the increased costs of funds leading to the higher revenue, 
while cost of labour with a negative sign implicates that the increased cost of labour 
leading to the lower total revenues. The directions of the relationships between the 
dependent and independent variabels are the same as in the whole country model. 
The Wald test does not reject the hypothesis of monopolistic market structure in 
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina where H-statistic=0 at 5% significance level. It 
however rejects the hypothesis of perfectly competitive market structure where H-
statistic=1 at the 5% significance level. The estimation of H= 0,033 indicates the 
conclusion that bank total revenues in the sample period in Federation of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina appear to be earned in conditions of monopoly or perfectly collusive 
oligopoly market structure.  
For the model using total revenues as dependent variable using data from 
Republika Srpska, the following variables are statistically significant: 𝑃𝐹, 𝐴𝑆𝑆, 𝐵𝑅 and 
𝐿𝑇𝐷. We remark that 𝑃𝐹, 𝐴𝑆𝑆, 𝐵𝑅 are in positive, while  𝑃𝐿, 𝐿𝑇𝐷 are in negative 
relation to total revenues. The cost of funds with a positive coefficient shows that the 
increased costs of funds leading to the higher revenue, while cost of labour with a 
negative sign implicates that the increased cost of labour leading to the lower total 
revenues. The directions of the relationships between the dependent and 
independent variabels are the same as in the whole country model. The Wald test 
does not reject the hypothesis of monopolistic market structure in Federation of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina where H-statistic=0 at 5% significance level. It however 
rejects the hypothesis of perfectly competitive market structure where H-statistic=1 at 
the 5% significance level. The estimation of H= -0,058 indicates the conclusion that 
bank total revenues in the sample period in Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
appear to be earned in conditions of monopoly or perfectly collusive oligopoly 
market structure.  
The P-R price model is created on the basis of ratio of total revenues to total assets 
(TR/TA) as dependent variable. On the whole country level the following variables 
are statistically significant: 𝑃𝐹, 𝑃𝐿, 𝐴𝑆𝑆, 𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐴𝑆𝑆, 𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁𝐴𝑆𝑆, 𝐵𝑅, 𝐿𝑇𝐷, and 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝐸. The 
model shows that 𝑃𝐹, 𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐴𝑆𝑆, 𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁𝐴𝑆𝑆, 𝐵𝑅 are in positive, while  𝑃𝐿, 𝐴𝑆𝑆, 𝐿𝑇𝐷 and 
𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝐸 are in negative relation to total revenues to total asset ratio. The Wald test 
rejects the hypothesis of monopolistic market structure in of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
where H-statistic=0 at 5% significance level, as well as hypothesis of perfectly 
competitive market structure where H-statistic=1 at the 5% significance level. The 
estimation of H= -0,268 indicates the conclusion that bank total revenues in the 
sample period in Bosnia and Herzegovina appear to be earned in conditions of 
monopoly or perfectly collusive oligopoly market structure.  
The model created with data from Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina the 
following variables are statistically significant: 𝑃𝐹, 𝑃𝐿, 𝐴𝑆𝑆, 𝐵𝑅, 𝐿𝑇𝐷. The model shows 
that 𝑃𝐹, 𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐴𝑆𝑆, 𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁𝐴𝑆𝑆, 𝐵𝑅 are in positive, while  𝑃𝐿, 𝐴𝑆𝑆, 𝐿𝑇𝐷 and 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝐸 are in 
negative relation to total revenues to total asset ratio. The Wald test did not reject 
the hypothesis of monopolistic market structure in of Bosnia and Herzegovina where 
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H-statistic=0 at 5% significance level. The Wald test rejected the hypothesis of 
perfectly competitive market structure where H-statistic=1 at the 5% significance 
level. The estimation of H= 0,033 indicates that bank total revenues in the sample 
period in Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina appear to be earned in conditions 
of monopoly or perfectly collusive oligopoly market structure.  
The model created with data from Republika Srpska the following variables are 
statistically significant:𝑃𝐹, 𝐴𝑆𝑆, 𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁𝐴𝑆𝑆, 𝐿𝑇𝐷. The model indicates that𝑃𝐹, 𝐴𝑆𝑆, 
𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁𝐴𝑆𝑆 are in positive, while  𝐿𝑇𝐷 is in negative relation to total revenues to total 
asset ratio. The Wald test did not reject the hypothesis of monopolistic market 
structure in of Bosnia and Herzegovina where H-statistic=0 at 5% significance level. 
The Wald test rejected the hypothesis of perfectly competitive market structure 
where H-statistic=1 at the 5% significance level. The estimation of H= -0,058 indicates 
that bank total revenues in the sample period in Federation of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina appear to be earned in conditions of monopoly or perfectly collusive 
oligopoly market structure.  
We also tested the banking market of Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as its entities 
for long-run equilibrium using an adequate transformation of ratio of pre-tax net 
profit to total asset (1+ROA) as the dependent variable. The Wald test for models for 
whole country as well as for the Republika Srpska model do rejected the null 
hypothesis H-statistic=0, which indicated that in the observed period the two banking 
markets are not in a long run equilibrium, while the model for Federation of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, shows that its banking market is in the long-run equilibrium, as the 
Wald test does not reject the hypothesis that H-statistic=0.  
 
Conclusions 
This paper investigated the market structure of the banking market in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and its constitutional entities using k-bank concentration ratio 
(〖CR〗_k) and Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) and the monopoly of banks using 
the Panzar-Rosse H-statistic during the period of 2008 – 1012. The results show that the 
both concentration ratios calculated for loans, deposits and total assets are 
exhibiting fairly high level but have a decreasing trend between 2008 and 2012. The 
Panzar-Rosse H-statistic suggests that banking market of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
observed as a whole and banking markets of constitutional entities that act as 
separate banking markets, tend to exhibit similar market structure results in most of 
the created models. Banks operating on the banking market in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina seem to be earning their total and interest revenues under monopoly or 
perfectly collusive oligopoly, with an exception for the Republika Srpska market in the 
model using interest revenues as dependent variable, with the H-statistic of 0,783 
indicates monopolistic competition.  
The estimates of the Panzar-Rosse H-statistics of a static model suggest that the 
Bosnia and Herzegovina Republika Srpska banking market were characterized by 
disequilibrium and equilibrium for Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina over the 
period between 2008 and 2012. In other words the study has shown that there was 
some correlation between return on assets and the prices of used factor inputs. As to 
our knowledge no similar studies have been conducted so far on either the Bosnia 
and Herzegovina or to its neighbouring countries, no comparative conclusions are 
viable.  
This research and its results are limited to one country and bank financial data 
published on their own or regulatory authorities’ and financial markets’ web sites. We 
propose further research in this area, using data from more than one developing 
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insight may help understand if any competition or efficiency differences exist 
between developed and developing banking markets.  
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Variable Minimum Maximum Sum Mean Std. Dev. 
logIR 13,079 19,404 1952,018 16,974 1,276 
logTR 13,835 19,608 1988,920 17,295 1,194 
log(TR/ASS) -3,190 -1,969 -295,967 -2,574 0,209 
log(1+ROA) -0,192 0,056 0,114 0,001 0,025 
logPF -4,564 -2,257 -391,231 -3,402 0,503 
logPL 9,231 10,594 1177,802 10,242 0,214 
logPK -3,685 1,803 -58,791 -0,511 0,934 
logASS 17,026 22,175 2284,886 19,869 1,182 
logCAPASS -8,178 -0,457 -225,103 -1,957 0,976 
logLOANASS -1,636 -0,192 -57,636 -0,501 0,240 
logBR -6,692 -2,030 -410,307 -3,568 1,097 
logLTD 0,479 5,293 130,906 1,138 0,588 
Source: Author’s calculations 
 
Appendix 2 
Estimation results for the Bosnian banks (2008-2012) log-log regression model 
dependent variable: logIR 
 
Whole country Federation B&H Republika Srpska 
Model 
variables 
Coeff. t-value Sig Coeff. t-value Sig Coeff. t-value Sig 
Intercept 1,746 1,596 0,113 1,718 1,346 0,183 -0,754 -0,287 0,776 
logPF 0,271 5,980 0,000 0,220 4,337 0,000 0,619 4,309 0,000 
logPL -0,213 -2,001 0,048 -0,175 -1,312 0,194 0,166 0,702 0,489 
logPK 0,027 1,220 0,225 0,060 2,064 0,043 -0,002 -0,037 0,971 
logASS 0,955 29,562 0,000 0,927 27,047 0,000 0,994 10,692 0,000 
logCAPASS 0,003 0,140 0,889 0,002 0,092 0,927 0,115 0,868 0,393 
logLOANASS 0,522 6,213 0,000 0,510 4,168 0,000 1,028 4,371 0,000 
logBR 0,059 1,756 0,082 0,068 1,769 0,081 0,036 0,458 0,650 
logLTD -0,124 -3,012 0,003 -0,068 -1,609 0,112 -0,675 -3,776 0,001 
Dummy5 0,043 1,019 0,310 0,055 1,341 0,184 -0,139 -0,719 0,478 
DummyE -0,059 -1,469 0,145 
      
          H-statistic 0,084 0,105 0,783 
Competition Monopoly Monopoly Monopolistic competition 
H0:H=0 
(p<0,050) 
Not rejected Not rejected Rejected 
H0:H=1 
(p<0,050) 
Rejected Rejected Rejected 
Adjusted R2 0,982 0,984 0,98 
# of 
observations 
115 78 37 
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Appendix 3 
Estimation results for the Bosnian banks (2008-2012) log-log regression model 
dependent variable: logTR 
 Whole country Federation B&H Republika Srpska 







Intercept 4,863 5,067 0,000 3,858 3,677 0,000 -0,712 -0,348 0,731 
logPF 0,224 5,630 0,000 0,277 6,640 0,000 0,242 2,164 0,040 
logPL -0,478 -5,109 0,000 -0,262 -2,384 0,020 -0,290 -1,567 0,129 
logPK -0,013 -0,694 0,489 0,017 0,718 0,475 -0,010 -0,285 0,778 
logASS 0,945 33,321 0,000 0,888 31,516 0,000 1,138 15,701 0,000 
logCAPASS 0,029 1,695 0,093 0,017 1,062 0,292 0,167 1,614 0,118 
logLOANASS 0,328 4,449 0,000 -0,006 -0,063 0,950 0,676 3,688 0,001 
logBR 0,064 2,180 0,032 0,094 2,976 0,004 -0,088 -1,441 0,161 
logLTD -0,176 -4,875 0,000 -0,156 -4,470 0,000 -0,466 -3,338 0,002 
Dummy5 0,004 0,101 0,920 0,028 0,834 0,407 -0,037 -0,247 0,807 
DummyE -0,123 -3,487 0,001         
              
H-statistic -0,268 0,033 -0,058 
Competition Monopoly Monopoly Monopoly 
F-value for H=0 Rejected Not rejected Not rejected 
F-value for H=1 Rejected Rejected Rejected 
Adjusted R2 0,984 0,988 0,987 
# of observations 115 78 37 
Source: Author’s calculations 
 
Appendix 4 
Estimation results for the Bosnian banks (2008-2012) log-log regression model 
dependent variable: log(TR/AS) 
 
Whole country Federation B&H Republika Srpska 
Model 
variables 
Coeff. t-value Sig Coeff. t-value Sig Coeff. t-value Sig 
Intercept 4,863 5,067 0,000 3,858 3,677 0,000 -0,712 -0,348 0,731 
logPF 0,224 5,630 0,000 0,277 6,640 0,000 0,242 2,164 0,040 
logPL -0,478 -5,109 0,000 -0,262 -2,384 0,020 -0,290 -1,567 0,129 
logPK -0,013 -0,694 0,489 0,017 0,718 0,475 -0,010 -0,285 0,778 
logASS -0,055 -1,951 0,054 -0,112 -3,971 0,000 0,138 1,909 0,067 
logCAPASS 0,029 1,695 0,093 0,017 1,062 0,292 0,167 1,614 0,118 
logLOANASS 0,328 4,449 0,000 -0,006 -0,063 0,950 0,676 3,688 0,001 
logBR 0,064 2,180 0,032 0,094 2,976 0,004 -0,088 -1,441 0,161 
logLTD -0,176 -4,875 0,000 -0,156 -4,470 0,000 -0,466 -3,338 0,002 
Dummy5 0,004 0,101 0,920 0,028 0,834 0,407 -0,037 -0,247 0,807 
DummyE -0,123 -3,487 0,001 
      
          H-statistic -0,268 0,033 -0,058 
Competition Monopoly Monopoly Monopoly 
F-value for 
H=0 
Rejected Not rejected Not rejected 
F-value for 
H=1 
Rejected Rejected Rejected 
Adjusted R2 0,472 0,570 0,617 
# of 
observations 
115 78 37 
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Appendix 5 
Estimation results for the Bosnian banks (2008-2012) log-log regression model 
dependent variable: log(1+ROA) 
log(1+ROA) Whole country Federation B&H Republika Srpska 
Model 
variables 
Coeff. t-value Sig Coeff. t-value Sig Coeff. t-value Sig 
Intercept -0,022 -0,178 0,859 -0,216 -1,655 0,102 -0,458 -1,482 0,150 
logPF -0,031 -6,007 0,000 -0,019 -3,678 0,000 -0,047 -2,812 0,009 
logPL -0,027 -2,204 0,030 0,004 0,285 0,777 -0,033 -1,198 0,241 
logPK -0,002 -0,712 0,478 0,000 0,132 0,895 0,008 1,378 0,180 
logASS 0,009 2,499 0,014 0,004 1,182 0,241 0,031 2,807 0,009 
logCAPASS 0,000 0,198 0,844 -0,001 -0,276 0,783 0,005 0,290 0,774 
logLOANASS 0,027 2,814 0,006 -0,021 -1,715 0,091 0,041 1,485 0,149 
logBR -0,003 -0,848 0,398 -0,003 -0,719 0,474 -0,016 -1,717 0,097 
logLTD 0,012 2,524 0,013 0,009 2,057 0,043 0,005 0,218 0,829 
Dummy5 -0,005 -1,055 0,294 -0,004 -1,010 0,316 -0,001 -0,044 0,965 
DummyE -0,004 -0,802 0,424 
      
          H-statistic -0,060 -0,015 -0,073 
Equilibrium Disequilibrium Equilibrium Disequilibrium 
F-value for 
H=0 
Rejected Not rejected Rejected 
Adjusted R2 0,342 0,222 0,629 
# of 
observations 
115 78 37 
Source: Author’s calculations 
 
 
